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Abstract
Asylum seekers are often assigned to localities upon arrival using uninformed matching
systems, which lead to inefficient and unfair allocations. This paper proposes an informed
dynamic mechanism as an intuitive and easy-to-implement alternative. Our mechanism can
be adopted in any dynamic refugee matching problem given locality-specific quotas and that
asylum seekers map into specific categories. Any matching selected by the proposed mech-
anism is Pareto efficient, and envy between localities is bounded by a single asylum seeker.
Our simulations show that the proposed mechanism outperforms uninformed mechanisms
even in presence of severe misclassification error in the estimation of asylum seeker cate-
gories.
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1 Introduction
According to UNHCR, 17.2 million persons obtained refugee status in 2016.1 In an attempt
to reduce pressure on countries sheltering large numbers of refugees, several international re-
settlement programs—the largest of which is operated by UNHCR—transfer a selected portion
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of refugees to countries that have agreed to admit them, and to ultimately grant them perma-
nent settlement.2 Although in practice these programs rarely take the characteristics and prefer-
ences of refugees and receiving countries into account, Jones and Teytelboym (2017a,b) note that
these types of resettlement schemes share many fundamental properties with classical two-sided
matching markets with capacity constraints such as the school choice problem (Abdulkadiroğlu
and Sönmez, 2003). Even if the computational and modeling complexity of asylum seeker al-
location is higher than that of a typical two-sided matching problem,3 results from the rapidly
growing market design literature can lead to vast improvements in efficiency, equity and feasi-
bility of refugee resettlement programs (Andersson, 2017; Bansak et al., 2018; Delacretaz et al.,
2016; Jones and Teytelboym, 2017a,b).
A crucial similarity between classical two-sided matching problems and refugee resettle-
ment programs is that all available information on both sides of the market—asylum seekers and
localities—is known when making the matching. Only once the full set of asylum seekers, their
characteristics, and all preferences are known, the matching can take place. However, gathering
such information necessarily requires holding asylum seekers in asylum centres for an undefined
period of time. Moreover, less than 1 percent of all asylum seekers are part of resettlement
programs.4 The vast majority of asylum seekers arrive directly to their host country, where the
assignment to localities needs to take place in a short period of time, and without any informa-
tion on future arrivals. The difficulty of predicting the characteristics of asylum seekers arriving
in the near future necessarily introduces dynamics to the problem, i.e., asylum seekers must be
assigned to localities directly upon arrival before the identity and characteristics of future arrivals
are revealed.
This paper solves this dynamic refugee matching problem by proposing an intuitive, easy-
to-implement and computationally efficient dynamic refugee matching mechanism that, by ex-
ploiting refugee-specific characteristics affecting the probability of successful integration at each
locality, guarantees an efficient and unenvious matching at each arrival among localities that have
not filled their quotas yet. The efficiency and the envy concepts are based on dynamic versions
of Pareto efficiency and envy-by-one (Budish, 2011), respectively.5
2In recent years, the United States has been the world’s top resettlement country followed, by Canada, Australia
and the Nordic countries. Since 2015, the European Union has also organized a series of resettlement programs in an
attempt to reduce pressure on the countries located at the external border of the European Union (Greece, Hungary
and Italy in particular).
3For example, refugees vary in several dimensions (education, spoken languages, household composition, need
for healthcare, etc.), which introduce multidimensional constraints and potential complementarities to the matching
problem. Complementarities have been studied in matching markets by, e.g., Hatfield and Kominers (2014), Kojima
et al. (2013), Pycia (2012) and Roth and Peranson (1999).
4The UNHCR program, for example, contained files of only 163,200 asylum seekers for consideration by re-
settlement countries, and of these, only 126,200 actually departed to resettlement countries. Similarly, while more
than 2.5 millions people applied for asylum in 2015 and 2016 alone in the European Union, the total number of
relocations within the European Union program stands at 24,676 as of July 24, 2017 (European Commission, Press
release, 26 July 2017, Brussels).
5The importance of these specific properties has also been stressed in several meetings that the authors of this
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Despite its simplicity, the proposed mechanism strongly outperforms uninformed mecha-
nisms such as those currently in use in, e.g., Sweden, Switzerland and the United States. Using
aggregate data from Sweden and the United States to calibrate random flows of asylum seekers,
this paper shows that even if the probability of successful integration for each asylum seeker and
locality is unknown and needs to be empirically estimated (as in Bansak et al., 2018), the pro-
posed matching mechanism increases efficiency by up to 50 percent, and guarantees a reduction
in envy of between 7 and 45 percent.
Although the results presented in this paper are not specific to a particular country, Sweden
represents a good example for describing the dynamic problem of matching asylum seekers to
localities within a country. An asylum seeker who enters Sweden is temporarily placed at a
Migration Board accommodation facility in anticipation of either a deportation order or a perma-
nent residence permit. This facility is located in some locality and the problem for the Migration
Board can, therefore, equivalently be described as a problem of matching asylum seekers to local-
ities.6 In the process of matching asylum seekers to localities, asylum seekers can be mapped into
specific groups, or categories (e.g., based on age, education, language knowledge, etc.). Asylum
seekers belonging to different categories may not only have different probabilities to integrate
overall, but also exhibit particular synergies with specific localities (Bansak et al., 2018).7
The current Swedish system to dynamically match asylum seekers to municipalities is ap-
proximately based on a random assignment coupled with municipality specific quotas. As de-
scribed by Bansak et al. (2018, p.325), a similar mechanism is employed by the resettlement
offices in the United States and by the federal government in Switzerland. Random mechanisms
are uninformed and, consequently, cannot exploit the heterogeneity among localities and asylum
seekers to achieve efficiency and fairness. In fact, if such heterogeneity is not taken into con-
sideration, the resulting matching may be both inefficient and unfair (this point is illustrated in
Section 4). In contrast to the random mechanism, the dynamic refugee matching mechanism pro-
posed in this paper takes both locality-specific characteristics and the background of the asylum
paper have had with the Swedish Migration Board. In fact, in a recent report (Swedish Government, SOU:2018:22,
2018), the Swedish Migration Board is recommended to further investigate the feasibility of some of the ideas
presented in this paper.
6Note that an asylum seeker may be transferred to a different locality once granted a residence permit. However,
as the authors of this paper has discussed with the Swedish Migration Board, asylum seekers will ideally stay in
the same locality as this creates incentives for the locality to start integrating the asylum seekers immediately after
arrival to Sweden. This is, in particular, true for asylum seekers that are classified to belong to “Track 1” (Swedish
“Spår 1”) according to the Migration Board classification systems. These are the asylum seekers that will be granted
asylum with a probability close to 100 percent, e.g., because they come from a specific conflict region.
7That nationality matters for assimilation has previously been established by, e.g., Ran et al. (2014). Edin
et al. (2003) and Damm (2009) show that matches between one’s nationality and that of other immigrants in a
locality affects the probability of successful integration. If one proxies integration with employment, locality-
specific heterogeneities in integration are also evident from aggregate data. 38.1 percent of all asylum seekers
with more than 9 years schooling arriving in Sweden in 2014 had an employment at the end of 2016. However,
employment probability in this group varies by gender (45.3 percent for males and 25.8 percent for females), and
these numbers vary between Swedish municipalities. See the web page of Statistics Sweden (www.scb.se).
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seekers into consideration and, consequently, exploits the heterogeneity among localities and
asylum seekers to achieve efficient and fair assignments. The employed efficiency and the fair-
ness concepts are dynamic versions of Pareto efficiency and an extended version of the concept
of envy-by-one (Budish, 2011). The latter property means that whenever some locality envies the
matching of some other locality, envy can be “eliminated” by removing a single asylum seeker
either from the matching of envious locality or from the matching of the envied locality.
Envy between localities occurs whenever different categories of asylum seekers are “de-
manded” at different rates among localities. Conflicts between localities arise if an asylum seeker
is either in high demand or not demanded at all. In such cases, there must be some rule that deter-
mines which locality the asylum seeker should be matched to. This paper resolves such conflicts
by means of priority and rejection orders, where the former determines the matching of highly
demanded asylum seekers and the latter determines the matching of non-demanded asylum seek-
ers. These orders constitute the backbone in the considered dynamic mechanism that matches
asylum seekers to localities. The main theoretical result demonstrates that if asylum seekers are
matched to localities based on the proposed mechanism, any matching of asylum seekers at any
point in time is Pareto efficient, and envy is bounded by a single asylum seeker (Theorem 1).
The theoretical results presented in this paper depend on the assumption that localities can
perfectly classify asylum seekers as either acceptable or unacceptable. However, even if refugee
characteristics are known, such classification will have to be empirically estimated and will,
therefore, suffer from misclassification error. To investigate the consequences of such error,
this paper simulates and evaluates the performance of the proposed matching mechanism in
specific settings calibrated to resemble the United States and the Swedish situations. These
simulations show that the proposed matching mechanism outperforms uninformed mechanisms
even in presence of severe misclassification error.
At least two properties make our framework different from traditional matching models.
First, the sequential arrival of asylum seekers introduces dynamics. Even if dynamic problems
have been considered in the literature before, e.g., in a kidney exchange (Ünver, 2009), kinder-
garten allocation (Kennes et al., 2014), daycare assignment (Kennes et al., 2014), and house
allocation (Bloch and Cantala, 2013; Kurino, 2009), a vast majority of the papers in the match-
ing literature focus on static matching.8 In static settings, the set of agents, preferences, etc. are
known when solving the matching problem and are not revealed during the process as in the
dynamic problem considered in this paper.
Second, in many of the traditional market design applications, the agents can provide a strict
ranking over the relevant objects. In, for example, the school choice problem (Abdulkadiroğlu
and Sönmez, 2003), parents have access to information about the schools in their locality and can
thus form preferences over schools. In the dynamic refugee matching problem, however, it may
be difficult for local authorities to form preferences over asylum seekers and vice versa, even if
8There is also a small literature on dynamic notions of stability, e.g., Damiano and Lam (2005), Gudmundsson
(2015), Kadam and Kotowski (2018b), and Kurino (2009). See also Section 2.
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asylum seekers and localities can be characterized. As a consequence, the preferences of both
the localities and the asylum seekers have to be estimated based on characteristics and historical
data.9 Such approach has recently been considered in a refugee matching context by Andersson
and Ehlers (2016) and Bansak et al. (2018).10
The remainder of the paper is outlined as follows. Section 2 highlights the paper’s contribu-
tions to the recent literature on dynamic matching. Section 3 introduces the theoretical frame-
work and some basic definitions. Section 4 describes the dynamic notions of envy-freeness and
Pareto efficiency. Section 5 presents and analyzes the dynamic refugee matching mechanism.
Section 6 evaluates the performance of the proposed mechanism in settings resembling the US
and the Swedish situations and in the presence of misclassification error. Section 7 concludes the
paper. All proofs and additional simulation results appear in the Appendices.
2 Related Matching Literature
Apart from the matching papers referred to in the above, there is also a small and quite recent
literature on dynamic matching. This literature and the problems considered therein together
with their associated assumptions will be described next.
One of the first papers on dynamic matching is due to Ünver (2009). In his investigated
dynamic kidney exchange framework, a certain number of patient-donor pairs arrive at each point
in time according to a Poisson process—meaning that each patient-donor type arrives with the
same probability across all periods—and a specific matching is implemented among the existing
patient-donor pairs in each period. The main contribution is the identification of a dynamically
efficient (Markovian) matching mechanisms that minimizes the discounted cost of waiting time.
The results are valid for a one-to-one dynamic matching market—as all patient-donor pairs only
demand exactly one kidney and donate at most one kidney—and the functionality of the dynamic
matching mechanism depends on detailed assumptions related to the arrival rates of the Poisson
process.
Kurino (2009) considers a dynamic house allocation problem with overlapping generations,
existing tenants and newcomers. In this framework, any agent lives for two periods and is a
newcomer in the first period and an existing tenant in the second period. It is shown that, in
general, no rule is dynamically Pareto efficient and strategy-proof, but that a seniority-based
Top Trading Cycles Mechanism is dynamically Pareto efficient and strategy-proof under time
invariant preferences.
9A different approach is taken by Moraga and Rapoport (2014) where preferences of asylum seekers and host
countries are known a priori and taken into consideration when designing a system with “tradable immigration
quotas”. Their proposed system exploits the comparative advantages of the hosting countries to efficiently match
asylum seekers.
10Haeringer and Iehlé (2017) consider a similar approach to Andersson and Ehlers (2016) for deducing prefer-
ences. Their objective is, however, to obtain information on stable matchings from partial observation of preferences.
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Kennes et al. (2014) model the daycare assignment problem as a dynamic version of the
school choice problem in which agents enter and exit the economy over time (agents are as-
sumed to live for two time periods). Daycare priorities are history-dependent in the sense that
unmatched agents from the previous period have higher priority than newcomers. The main
results show that no stable and strategy-proof mechanism exists but that a serial dictatorship
mechanism is both Pareto efficient and strategy-proof.11
Kadam and Kotowski (2018a) consider a dynamic matching problem over two periods with
the same set of agents. They first show that dynamically stable matchings generally do not exist
and then identify preference restrictions under which existence is guaranteed. Given their prefer-
ence restrictions, a dynamic version of the Deferred Acceptance Mechanism is demonstrated to
be strategy-proof (here, the second-period preferences are defined conditional on the first-period
matching). Kadam and Kotowski (2018b) consider a generalization of this model to a finite num-
ber of time periods with the same set of agents being potentially matched in all periods, and show
the existence of dynamically stable matchings under certain preference restrictions.12
Doval (2017) considers a general dynamic matching problem over two periods with the same
set of agents where matches are irreversible and agent preferences over dynamic matchings are
given by discounted utility.13 The adopted notions of dynamic stability and dynamic core differ
from the one in Kadam and Kotowski (2018a,b). Nevertheless, one of the main results show
that the dynamic core may be empty. Given this finding, different conditions that guarantee the
non-emptiness of the dynamic core is presented.
A number of factors make this paper different from these matching papers. A first difference
is that all theoretical results presented in this paper are independent of distributional assumptions
on arrival rates and times. Second, most of the existing papers in the dynamic matching literature
start by considering general models and, therefore, obtain mostly negative results for their corre-
sponding dynamic frameworks. As a consequence, large efforts are devoted to finding additional
assumptions and restrictions that lead to positive results. Third, this paper does not consider dy-
namically stable matchings in contrast to many of the above mentioned papers. Instead, the main
focus is on dynamic notions of envy-freeness and Pareto efficiency.14 Finally, in the model con-
sidered in this paper, asylum seekers only require to be matched to one locality and localities are
only active until their quotas are filled. Therefore, because the considered matching mechanism
takes the characteristics of the asylum seekers into account, the size of the economy at a specific
point in time is history-dependent, i.e., the size of the economy depends on the characteristics of
11Kennes et al. (2015) show that the proportion of agents manipulating the dynamic Deferred Acceptance Mech-
anism is “small” in a large economy.
12See also Kotowski (2015) for a note on the dynamic stability notion used in this context. Kurino (2009) studies
credible group stable matchings in a dynamic context with cardinal utilities.
13This model encompasses dynamic one-sided and two-sided matching markets. See Doval (2016) for an analysis
of many-to-many matching markets when arrivals are stochastic.
14It can, however, be argued that Pareto efficiency, as defined in this paper, implies some sort of dynamic stability.
For a recent paper on stability in a refugee matching context, see Aziz et al. (2018).
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the asylum seekers that has arrived before that specific point in time.
3 The Model and Basic Definitions
This section introduces the basic ingredients of the dynamic refugee matching model and a num-
ber of important concepts and definitions.
3.1 Asylum Seekers and Localities
Asylum seekers arrive in a sequence s = (s(1), . . . , s(n)) to a country within a predetermined
period. One can think of the period as a calendar year but the model can be applied to periods of
arbitrary length.15 It is assumed that the n asylum seekers in the sequence s arrive one-by-one,
meaning that the period can be divided into n (shorter) time periods where one asylum seeker
arrives at each point in time k ∈ {1, . . . , n}. The kth asylum seeker to arrive is denoted by s(k)
and is sometimes referred to as arrival k.
Asylum seekers are of different categories (or “types”) describing their characteristics (e.g., in
terms of age, education, spoken languages, etc.). The set of all possible categories is denoted by
T = {t1, . . . , t|T |}. The category of asylum seeker s(k) is denoted by t(s(k)) ∈ T . Throughout
the paper, it is assumed that while the number of asylum seekers that arrive within the period
(i.e., the cardinality of the sequence s) is known, how many asylum seekers of each category
arriving within the period is unknown (i.e., the category distribution of the asylum seekers in the
sequence s).
Localities are gathered in the set M = {1, . . . , |M |}. One can think of a locality as a state,
a municipality or some other administrative subdivision of a country. Each locality m ∈ M
has a quota qm specifying the number of asylum seekers to be assigned to the locality within
the period. The quotas are gathered in the vector q = (q1, . . . , q|M |) and are chosen such that∑|M |
m=1 qm = |s|, i.e., such that all asylum seekers are assigned to some locality. In reality, one
may not be able to predict the exact number of asylum seekers arriving during the period. If the
quotas are not exhausted at the end of the period, then one may start the next period with new
quotas. If the quotas are exhausted before the end of the period, then one may start a new period
or an overhead (federal) facility may take any asylum seekers arriving after the first n arrivals.
Localities classify each category t ∈ T as either acceptable or unacceptable and, conse-
quently, also classify any given asylum seeker as either acceptable or unacceptable. This classi-
fication may be based on, e.g., historical observations and/or current labour market conditions.
Formally, this means that each locality m partitions T into two disjoint sets, T+m and T
−
m , where
the former set contains all acceptable categories in T and the latter set contains all unaccept-
able categories in T . This partition is, for locality m ∈ M , denoted by Tm = (T+m , T−m) where
15See Section 6.2 and the discussion following Definition 6 for additional remarks related to the choice of period.
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T+m ∩ T−m = ∅ and T+m ∪ T−m = T . The partitions of all localities are gathered in the vector
T = (T1, . . . , T|M |).
3.2 The Dynamic Economy
Not all localities and not all asylum seekers are relevant during the entire period as asylum
seekers arrive in a sequence s, and localities cannot be assigned additional asylum seekers once
their quotas are filled. To formalize this, let, for any given k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the set M(k) contain
all localities which have not yet filled their quotas when asylum seeker s(k) arrives. Let the
set A(k) contain all asylum seekers in the set {s(1), . . . , s(k)} who have been assigned to some
locality in M(k). An economy E(k) = (M(k),T(k), A(k)) at arrival k contains the localities in
M(k) and their partitions of categories T(k) = (Tm)m∈M(k) together with the asylum seekers in
A(k).
3.3 Preferences and Matchings
A bundle xm(k) contains all asylum seekers in A(k) who have been matched to locality m ∈
M(k) in economy E(k). A (dynamic) matching, at a given point in time k, is a vector x(k) =
(xm(k))m∈M(k) containing the bundles of all localities in M(k). A matching is feasible, for the
localities in M(k), if no locality has been matched to more asylum seekers than its quota, i.e., if
|xm(k)| ≤ qm for all m ∈M(k).16
Because localities classify each asylum seeker as either acceptable or unacceptable, any lo-
cality m ∈ M(k) can partition all asylum seekers in a given bundle xi(k) into two disjoint sets,
A+m(xi(k)) and A
−
m(xi(k)), where the former set contains all acceptable asylum seekers in bun-
dle xi(k) and the latter set contains all unacceptable asylum seekers in bundle xi(k). Given this
type of partitioning, it is assumed that a locality in M(k) weakly ranks any two given bundles
in economy E(k) based on the number of acceptable and unacceptable asylum seekers. More
precisely, throughout the paper, it will be assumed that for any two bundles, xi(k) and xj(k),
containing weakly fewer asylum seekers than the quota of locality m, locality m strictly prefers
bundle xi(k) to bundle xj(k) if and only if the difference between the number of acceptable and
the number of unacceptable asylum seekers is larger in the former bundle than in the latter, i.e.,
if and only if:
|A+m(xi(k))| − |A−m(xi(k))| > |A+m(xj(k))| − |A−m(xj(k))|. (1)
16Note that the set M(k) contains all localities that have not filled their quota when asylum seeker s(k) arrives.
This means that once s(k) has been matched to a locality, the quota is binding for at most one locality at matching
x(k).
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Similarly, locality m is indifferent between any two bundles if and only if:
|A+m(xi(k))| − |A−m(xi(k))| = |A+m(xj(k))| − |A−m(xj(k))|. (2)
If locality m ∈ M(k) weakly prefers bundle xi(k) to bundle xj(k), the notational convention
xi(k)Rm(k)xj(k) will be adopted to describe the relationship. The strict and indifference parts
of Rm(k) are denoted by Pm(k) and Im(k), respectively.
A (deterministic) dynamic matching mechanism is a rule ϕ that for each k ∈ {1, . . . , n}
matches asylum seeker s(k) to a locality in M(k) as soon as the asylum seeker arrives.17
3.4 Notions of Demand
When the dynamic refugee matching mechanism is introduced in Section 5, it will be necessary
to classify asylum seekers also in terms of aggregated demand. For this purpose, asylum seeker
s(k) is defined to be:
• non-demanded if s(k) is unacceptable for all localities in M(k),
• demanded if s(k) is acceptable for exactly one locality in M(k),
• overdemanded if s(k) is acceptable for two or more localities in M(k).
Note that the “demand status” of an asylum seeker s(k) of category t(s(k)) may change through-
out the dynamic process when localities fill their quotas. If, for example, a specific category is
overdemanded in the first time period, this specific category will be demanded as soon as all
but one of localities that find the category acceptable have filled their quotas. When all these
localities have filled their quotas, the category will be non-demanded. However, it cannot be the
case that a non-demanded (demanded) category becomes demanded or overdemanded (overde-
manded) since the category partitioning T is assumed to be constant throughout the entire period.
To evaluate the outcome of the simulation study in Section 6, an additional partitioning of
the demanded and the overdemanded asylum seekers is needed. More precisely, and as will
be explained in Section 6, much of the efficiency gains from adopting an informed matching
mechanism is due to the asylum seekers that are acceptable by some but not all localities. For
this reason, an asylum seeker s(k) will, in Section 6, be defined to belong to the set:
• D if asylum seeker s(k) is acceptable by all localities in M ,
• D if asylum seeker s(k) is acceptable by some but not all localities in M ,
• D if asylum seeker s(k) is unacceptable for all localities in M .
17In the remaining part of the paper, it is understood that only feasible dynamic mechanisms are considered.
These are mechanisms which always select a feasible matching.
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4 Dynamic Notions of Envy-freeness and Pareto Efficiency
This section introduces notions of fairness and efficiency in order to evaluate the dynamic refugee
matching model from the previous section.
Because the distribution of categories in any given sequence of asylum seekers s is ex-ante
unknown, it is impossible to construct a mechanism that for any sequence s always selects a
matching satisfying a set of predetermined properties ex-post after the arrival of the last asylum
seeker in the sequence. For this reason, the fairness and efficiency properties, considered in this
paper, will be defined for a given economy E(k) at a given arrival k ∈ {1, . . . , n}. This also
means that predictions of future arrivals are not taken into consideration in the matching process.
There is a variety of plausible notions that can be used to evaluate a given matching but the
analysis in this paper is restricted to two classical properties, namely envy-freeness and Pareto
efficiency.
A matching is envy-free (Foley, 1967) if no locality envies any other locality at a given
matching. Modified for the considered dynamic setting, this property states that a matching
x(k) is envy-free in a given economy E(k) if xm(k)Rm(k)xm′(k) for any m,m′ ∈ M(k). It is
well-known that envy-free matchings generally do not exist when objects are indivisible (as the
asylum seekers in this problem) and in the absence of monetary transfers.18 For this reason, the
notion of envy-freeness will be slightly modified following Budish (2011). More specifically, in
the remaining part of the paper, matchings that satisfy envy bounded by a single asylum seeker
will be considered. This property means that whenever some locality m envies some locality
m′, the envy can be “eliminated” by removing a single asylum seeker either from the bundle of
locality m or from the bundle of locality m′.19
Definition 1. For a given economy E(k) = (M(k),T(k), A(k)), a matching x(k) satisfies envy
bounded by a single asylum seeker if, for any m,m′ ∈ M(k), at least one of the following
conditions hold:
(i) xm(k)Rm(k)xm′(k),
(ii) there exists some asylum seeker a ∈ xm(k) such that xm(k) \ {a}Rm(k)xm′(k),
(iii) there exists some asylum seeker a′ ∈ xm′(k) such that xm(k)Rm(k)xm′(k) \ {a′}.
18To see this, suppose that there are two localities and that the first asylum seeker that arrives is acceptable for
both localities. In this case, the locality that not is assigned the first asylum seeker will always envy the other locality
at matching x(1) according to condition (1).
19Note that this definition is different from the corresponding definition in Budish (2011) since some objects
(asylum seekers in this paper) may be unacceptable and, in this case, envy bounded by a single object may be
achieved by removing unacceptable objects from the agent’s (localities in this paper) own bundle. In Budish (2011),
no agent is assigned unacceptable objects and it, consequently, suffices to remove acceptable objects from the
bundles of other agents.
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The notion of envy bounded by a single asylum seeker is important in a refugee matching con-
text, because it guarantees that asylum seekers in high demand and asylum seeker that are non-
demanded will be more fairly distributed across localities. This notion is also quite weak in the
sense that it does not reveal anything about the number of acceptable and unacceptable asylum
seekers who are matched to a specific locality. To make this point clear, suppose that locality m
experiences that it has been matched to two acceptable and three unacceptable asylum seekers
and that locality m experiences that some other locality m′ has been matched to five acceptable
and five unacceptable asylum seekers. In this case, locality m experiences that envy is bounded
by a single asylum seeker. However, by isolating the asylum seekers and by only considering
acceptable asylum seekers or by only considering unacceptable asylum seekers (again from the
viewpoint of locality m), it is clear that locality m envies locality m′ in terms of acceptable asy-
lum seekers (and if localities m and m′ share their views on unacceptable asylum seekers, then
locality m′ envies locality m in terms of unacceptable asylum seekers).
To evaluate envy in matchings from the perspective of only acceptable asylum seekers, the
notion of envy bounded by a single acceptable asylum seeker will be adopted. This property is
satisfied for locality m in relation to locality m′, if locality m experiences that it is matched to at
most one fewer acceptable asylum seeker than locality m′ at a given matching x(k). The notion
of envy bounded by a single unacceptable asylum seeker is defined in a corresponding fashion.
Definition 2. For a given economy E(k) = (M(k),T(k), A(k)), a matching x(k) and two lo-
calities m,m′ ∈ M(k), locality m is unenvious of locality m′ in terms of acceptable asylum
seekers if |A+m(xm(k))| ≥ |A+m(xm′(k))|; and m’s envy towards locality m′ is bounded by a
single acceptable asylum seeker if |A+m(xm(k))| ≥ |A+m(xm′(k))| − 1.
Definition 3. For a given economy E(k) = (M(k),T(k), A(k)), a matching x(k) and two lo-
calities m,m′ ∈ M(k), locality m is unenvious of locality m′ in terms of unacceptable asylum
seekers if |A−m(xm(k))| ≤ |A−m(xm′(k))|; and m’s envy towards m′ is bounded by a single unac-
ceptable asylum seeker if |A−m(xm(k))| − 1 ≤ |A−m(xm′(k))|.
To evaluate efficiency properties of matchings, the notion of Pareto efficiency is adopted. In the
considered dynamic setting, this property states that a matching x(k) is Pareto efficient in a given
economy E(k) if it is impossible to reallocate the asylum seekers, which have been matched to
the localities in M(k), among the localities in M(k) in such a way that all quotas are respected,
all localities are weakly better off, and at least one locality is strictly better off.
Definition 4. For a given economy E(k) = (M(k),T(k), A(k)), a matching x(k) is Pareto
efficient if it is impossible to reallocate the asylum seekers in A(k) among the localities in
M(k) to obtain a new matching x′(k) where the quotas are respected for all localities in M(k),
x′m(k)Rm(k)xm(k) for all m ∈M(k), and x′m(k)Pm(k)xm(k) for some m ∈M(k).
The notion of Pareto efficiency is important in the refugee matching context as it guarantees that
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an asylum seeker that is acceptable for some locality in M(k) never can be matched to a locality
in M(k) that considers the asylum seeker as unacceptable.
5 Dynamic Order Mechanisms
This section introduces a dynamic matching mechanism and demonstrates that any matching
selected by the proposed mechanism is Pareto efficient and satisfies envy bounded by a single
asylum seeker. The basic observation is that asylum seekers must be matched to some locality
directly upon arrival, and therefore conflicts between localities may arise because some asylum
seekers are non-demanded and some asylum seekers are overdemanded. In either case, there
must be some rule determining the locality that the asylum seeker should be matched to. These
conflicts are resolved by means of priority and rejection orders where the former is used to
resolve conflicts when an asylum seeker is overdemanded and the latter is adopted to match
non-demanded asylum seekers to localities. Formally, an order τ is, for a given M(k), a list
(τ1, . . . , τ|M(k)|) such that {τ1, . . . , τ|M(k)|} = M(k). This means that each locality, which has
not yet filled its quota at arrival k, i.e., each locality in the setM(k), is assigned a unique position
in the list τ .
A priority structure π specifies for each arrival k an order in which overdemanded asylum
seekers are assigned, i.e., it is a list of orders π = (π(k))nk=1 where π(k) is an order of M(k) for
any given point in time k ∈ {1, . . . , n}. This means that if asylum seeker s(k) is overdemanded,
then the locality π1(k) has the highest priority over asylum seeker s(k) among all localities in
M(k), the locality with π2(k) has the second highest priority among all localities in M(k), and
so on.
A rejection structure σ specifies for each arrival k an order in which non-demanded asylum
seekers are assigned, i.e., it is a list of orders σ = (σ(k))nk=1 where σ(k) is an order of M(k) for
any given point in time k ∈ {1, . . . , n}. This means that if asylum seeker s(k) is non-demanded,
then all localities in M(k) find asylum seeker s(k) unacceptable and s(k) is assigned to locality
σ1(k).
An order structure is a pair (π, σ) where π is a priority structure and σ is a rejection structure.
Throughout it is assumed that the structure (π(1), σ(1)) is exogenously given, i.e., that the struc-
ture is in place when the first asylum seeker s(1) arrives. The structure (π(1), σ(1)) may, for
example, be chosen randomly or based on inheritance from the previous period (see also Section
6.2). A dynamic order mechanism is used to resolve conflicts of the above mentioned type.
Definition 5. A (dynamic) order mechanism ϕ is given by an order structure (π, σ) such that for
k ∈ {1, . . . , n} it selects a matching x(k) where asylum seeker s(k) is assigned to:
(i) the locality in M(k) with the highest position in σ(k) if s(k) is non-demanded,
(ii) the only locality in M(k) which finds s(k) acceptable if s(k) is demanded,
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(iii) the locality in M(k) with the highest position in π(k) which finds s(k) acceptable if s(k)
is overdemanded.
Until this point, orders have been generally defined and it has not explicitly been stated if and
how orders should be “updated” between any two arrivals k and k+1. Given the interest in order
mechanisms and matchings where envy is bounded by a single asylum seeker, a first observation
is that the priority order and the rejection order must be updated between any two arrivals.
Example 1. Let M(1) = {m1,m2} and suppose that (π(1), σ(1)) are such that locality m1 has
the highest position in π(1) and locality m2 has the highest position in σ(1). Assume further
that matchings are selected by an order mechanism where only the priority order is updated
when an overdemanded asylum seeker is matched to a locality and only the rejection order is
updated when a non-demanded asylum seeker is matched to a locality. Then if asylum seeker
s(1) is acceptable for both localities, s(1) must be matched to locality m1, and if asylum seeker
s(2) is non-demanded, s(2) must be matched to locality m2. But then envy is not bounded by
a single asylum seeker at matching x(2). The same conclusion holds if asylum seeker s(1) is
non-demanded and asylum seeker s(2) is acceptable for both localities. 
The above example demonstrates that if localities are not sufficiently “rewarded” when matched
to a non-demanded asylum seeker and are not sufficiently “penalized” when matched to an
overdemanded asylum seeker, envy need not generally be bounded by a single asylum seeker.
To find the right compromise between rewards and penalties, the notion of rotation will be intro-
duced.
To formalize the idea of rotation, suppose that asylum seeker s(k) is matched to locality
m ∈ M(k). Let also σO(k) be the position of the locality with the highest position in σ(k)
envying locality m at matching x(k), and let σO(k) = |M(k)| if no such locality exists. Let
further πN(k) be the position of the locality with the highest position in π(k) which is envied by
locality m at matching x(k), and let πN(k) = |M(k)| if no such locality exists.
Definition 6. Consider a given economy E(k) = (M(k),T(k), A(k)). An order structure (π, σ)
satisfies rotation if for any k ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}, asylum seeker s(k) is assigned to locality m ∈
M(k), then:
(i) all localities in M(k) \ {m} have the same positions among themselves in π(k+1) and in
π(k),
(ii) all localities in M(k) \ {m} have the same positions among themselves in σ(k+1) and in
σ(k),
(iii) if locality m has not filled its quota after being assigned asylum seeker s(k), then:
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(a) if asylum seeker s(k) is non-demanded, locality m gets the lowest position in the
rejection order σ(k + 1) and locality m is placed immediately before πN(k) in the
priority order π(k+1) if πN(k) is smaller than the position ofm in π(k) and otherwise
π(k + 1) = π(k) (i.e. m keeps the same position in π(k + 1) as in π(k)),
(b) if asylum seeker s(k) is demanded, localitym has the same position in priority orders
π(k + 1) and π(k) as well as in the rejection orders σ(k + 1) and σ(k),
(c) if asylum seeker s(k) is overdemanded, locality m gets the lowest position in the
priority order π(k + 1) and locality m is placed immediately before σO(k) in the re-
jection order σ(k+1) if σO(k) is smaller than the position ofm in σ(k) and otherwise
σ(k + 1) = σ(k) (i.e. m keeps the same position in σ(k + 1) as in σ(k)).
Before illustrating an order mechanism that satisfies rotation (Examples 2 and 3), two remarks
are in order. Note first that the priority order and, consequently, the order mechanism and the
concept of rotation does not make any separation between asylum seeker categories, i.e., the
same priority order is considered for each category in T(k). Both the order mechanism and
the concept of rotation can be generalized by specifying a priority order for each category in
T(k), i.e., a (generalized) priority order (πt(k))t∈T(k) for each k ∈ {1, . . . , n}. In such case, it
is important to update each priority order in (πt(k))t∈T(k) between any two arrivals (otherwise,
it is easy to see envy by a single asylum seeker may be violated). This can be achieved by
identifying a vector of priority order specific constants πN(k) = (πNt (k))t∈T(k) for each arrival
k ∈ {1, . . . , n} exactly as in the above, and by adjusting the concept of rotation accordingly. For
example, Part (a) in Definition 6(iii) needs to be written as:
(a’) if asylum seeker s(k) is non-demanded, locality m gets the lowest position in the rejection
order σ(k+1) and for each t ∈ T(k), localitym is placed immediately before πNt (k) in the
priority order πt(k + 1) if πNt (k) is smaller than the position of m in πt(k) and otherwise
πt(k + 1) = πt(k) (i.e. m keeps the same position in πt(k + 1) as in πt(k)).
This paper considers the less general approach without loss of generality since all results and
conclusions presented in the paper continue to hold also for the more general setting. The rea-
son for considering a less general framework is simply to avoid introducing additional notation.
Moreover, because all priority orders and the rejection order must be updated between any two
arrivals, based on envy, it follows that all priority orders will be identical after “sufficiently many”
arrivals. Hence, the more general approach only makes a (small) difference in the very beginning
of the dynamic process.
Note also that localities with smaller quotas will typically fill their quotas before localities
with larger quotas so it may well be the case that certain localities are only active during a small
part of the sequence. If the latter issue is seen as a problem, then one can resolve it by splitting
the period into multiple shorter periods (e.g., instead of considering yearly quotas, one may split
them in trimester quotas; see Section 6.2).
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Example 2. This example illustrates how the constants πN(k) and σO(k) should be interpreted
in Definition 6. Suppose that the matching is selected by an order mechanism satisfying rotation,
and that the priority order π(k) is given by m4 < m2 < m1 < m3 and rejection order σ(k)
by m1 < m2 < m3 < m4. If asylum seeker s(k) is non-demanded, then s(k) is matched
to locality m1 since m1 has the highest position in the rejection order σ(k). If locality m1
only envies locality m3 after being matched to asylum seeker s(k), it follows that πN(k) = 4.
Because the position of m1 is smaller than 4 in π(k), π(k + 1) = π(k) and σ(k + 1) is given
by m2 < m3 < m4 < m1. If instead asylum seeker s(k) is acceptable by localities m1 and m4,
asylum seeker s(k) is overdemanded and, consequently, matched to locality m4 since locality
m4 has the highest position in the priority-ordering π(k) among all localities which find s(k)
acceptable. Thus, π(k+1) is given by m2 < m1 < m3 < m4. If locality m1 then envies locality
m4, it follows that σO(k) = 1 and σ(k + 1) is given by m4 < m1 < m2 < m3. 
Example 3. To illustrate an order mechanism satisfying rotation, suppose thatM(1) = {m1,m2,m3}
and s = (1, . . . , 10, . . .). Assume further that the quotas for all localities in M(1) are greater
than 10. This assumption means that we do not need to take into account quotas during the
first 10 arrivals. Let the initial priority order π(1) and rejection order σ(1) both be given by
m1 < m2 < m3. Suppose further that the “demand matrix” of the localities for the 10 first
arrivals is given by Table 1 (the numbers 0 and 1 indicate that an asylum seeker is unacceptable
and acceptable, respectively).
Table 1: Acceptable and unacceptable asylum seekers for the localities in Example 1.
s 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
m1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1
m2 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1
m3 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1
Because asylum seeker s(1) is non-demanded and locality m1 has the highest position in the
rejection order σ(1), asylum seeker s(1) is matched to locality m1. Consequently, locality m1
envies both locality m2 and m3 at matching x(1) and because locality m2 has a higher position
than locality m3 in the priority order π(1) (i.e., position 2), it follows that πN(1) = 2. Hence,
π(2) is given by m1 < m2 < m3. Furthermore, locality m1 is placed at the bottom of the
rejection order σ(2), i.e., σ(2) is given by m2 < m3 < m1. The entire process for the first
10 arrivals is described in Table 2. From this table, it follows that, at matching x(10), asylum
seekers s(1), s(3), s(6) and s(7) are matched to locality m1, asylum seekers s(2), s(4), s(9)
and s(10) are matched to locality m2, and asylum seekers s(5) and s(8) are matched to locality
m3. 
The first result establishes that any order mechanism satisfying rotation always selects a Pareto
efficient matching where envy is bounded by a single asylum seeker.
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Theorem 1. Let ϕ = (π, σ) be an order mechanism where (π, σ) satisfies rotation. For each
k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, if matching x(k) is selected by ϕ for economy E(k) = (M(k),T(k), A(k)),
then:
(i) x(k) satisfies envy bounded by a single asylum seeker, and
(ii) x(k) is Pareto efficient.
From Theorem 1, it follows almost immediately that each locality in M(k) must be unenvious
of any other locality in M(k) either in terms of acceptable or unacceptable asylum seekers (or
both) because if this is not the case, envy cannot be bounded by a single asylum seeker. If, for
example, locality m envies locality m′ by exactly one acceptable asylum seeker (the “minimal
amount” of envy), then envy towards municipality m′ will not be bounded by a single asylum
seeker for any positive amount of envy in terms of unacceptable asylum seekers. In this situation,
it thus follows that locality m must be unenvious of locality m′ in terms of unacceptable asylum
seekers. This finding is formally stated in the following corollary to Theorem 1.
Table 2: Description of an order mechanism that satisfies rotation for Example 3.
k s(k) matched to mi σO(k) πN(k) σ(k) π(k)
1 m1 – 2 m1 < m2 < m3 m1 < m2 < m3
2 m2 – 3 m2 < m3 < m1 m1 < m2 < m3
3 m1 3 – m3 < m1 < m2 m1 < m2 < m3
4 m2 3 – m3 < m1 < m2 m2 < m3 < m1
5 m3 – 2 m3 < m1 < m2 m3 < m1 < m2
6 m1 – 3 m1 < m2 < m3 m3 < m1 < m2
7 m1 3 – m2 < m3 < m1 m3 < m1 < m2
8 m3 3 – m2 < m3 < m1 m3 < m2 < m1
9 m2 – 2 m2 < m3 < m1 m2 < m1 < m3
10 m2 3 – m3 < m1 < m2 m2 < m1 < m3
11 m3 < m1 < m2 m1 < m3 < m2
Corollary 1. Let ϕ = (π, σ) be an order mechanism where (π, σ) satisfies rotation. For each
k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, if matching x(k) is selected by ϕ for economy E(k) = (M(k),T(k), A(k)),
then for any two localities m,m′ ∈ M(k), it holds that locality m is unenvious of locality m′
in terms of acceptable asylum seekers and/or unenvious of locality m′ in terms of unacceptable
asylum seekers.
Since an order that satisfies rotation (π(k), σ(k)) is updated based on the selected matching x(k),
it is possible to identify some very specific “envy patterns” in any structure (π(k+ 1), σ(k+ 1))
as reported in the following theorem.
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Theorem 2. Let ϕ = (π, σ) be an order mechanism where (π, σ) satisfies rotation. For each
k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, if matching x(k) is selected by ϕ for economy E(k) = (M(k),T(k), A(k)),
then locality m ∈ M(k) does not envy any locality with a higher position in π(k + 1) or any
locality with a lower position in σ(k + 1).
Finally, as noted in Section 4, the notion of envy bounded by a single asylum seeker is quite weak
since it does not say anything about the number of acceptable and the number of unacceptable
asylum seekers contained in the bundle of locality m in the matching x(k) and, furthermore,
how these numbers relate to the corresponding numbers of the other bundles in the matching
x(k) (from the perspective of locality m). The above two results are also silent about such rela-
tion. Ideally, we would like to prove that, at any matching x(k) selected by an order mechanism
that satisfies rotation, envy is always bounded by a single acceptable asylum seeker and a single
unacceptable asylum seeker. This means, for example, that if localitym at matching x(k) experi-
ences that it has been assigned two acceptable (three unacceptable, respectively) asylum seekers,
then it cannot be the case that locality m experiences that some other locality m′ at matching
x(k) has been assigned more than three acceptable (less than two unacceptable, respectively)
asylum seekers.20 We have, however, been unable to theoretically prove such result. Based on
the simulations presented in Section 6 and Appendix B, we conjecture that this result holds since
the maximum envy measure of acceptable and unacceptable asylum seekers never exceeds one
in any of the 100 million observed envy measures.
6 Implementation: Misclassification and Quotas
The proposed order mechanism is simple to implement given locality-specific quotas and locality
specific partitions of categories A+m(xi(k)) and A
−
m(xi(k)). However, the choice of these inputs
has two practical implications. First, locality preferences need to be estimated, and thus locality-
specific partitions will suffer from misclassification error. Second, a centralized clearinghouse
can aggregate or split quotas over the period to affect whether localities with low quotas remain
in the economy for multiple shorter spells, or for fewer longer ones.
This section begins by simulating and evaluating the performance of the proposed matching
mechanism in several specific settings where these implications are likely to matter. Our simula-
tions show that the proposed mechanism outperforms the uninformed naïve sequential matching
mechanism (defined below) even in presence of severe misclassification error. Furthermore, with
random flows of asylum seekers, the choice of splitting quotas across shorter time periods does
20Note that this result does not follow from Theorem 1 and Corollary 1. The statements in these results are not
violated if, e.g., locality m is matched to two acceptable asylum seekers and three unacceptable asylum seekers
at matching x(k) and locality m experiences that locality m′ is matched to five acceptable and five unacceptable
asylum seekers at matching x(k). In this case, envy is bounded by a single asylum seeker (Theorem 1) and locality
m is also unenvious of locality m′ in terms of unacceptable asylum seekers (Corollary 1). However, envy is not
bounded by a single acceptable asylum seeker.
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not affect the performance of the mechanism if every time period is treated independently. How-
ever, splitting quotas can improve fairness at minor efficiency costs if measures of envy across
municipalities are carried forward from period to period.
The section concludes by providing simulation results supporting our conjecture, stated in
Section 5, that envy is always bounded both by a single acceptable asylum seeker and by a single
unacceptable asylum seeker whenever the matching is selected by an order mechanism satisfying
rotation.
6.1 Misclassification Error in Locality Partitions
Estimating locality-specific partitions of categories A+m(xi(k)) and A
−
m(xi(k)) is equivalent to
predicting a demand matrix such as the one in Table 1, using asylum seeker characteristics as
independent variables and desirable outcomes proxying integration (e.g., predicted probability
of future employment) as dependent variables. For example, Bansak et al. (2018) use a machine
learning algorithm to estimate such a matrix, using refugee data from the United States and
Switzerland and allowing for locality-specific synergies with heterogeneous refugees. Nonethe-
less, out-of-sample prediction implies at least some misclassification error between the real and
the estimated locality-specific partitions. Specifically, Bansak et al. (2018) report 24 percent and
14 percent misclassification error for their preferred models, estimated on US and Swiss data,
respectively.21
This section assesses the sensitivity of the proposed mechanism to misclassification error by
simulating random flows of asylum seekers calibrated to match aggregate data for the United
States and Sweden. For each of these simulated flows, an increasingly high amount of misclas-
sification error in the locality-specific partitions is introduced. The evolution of the measures
of envy-freeness and efficiency are then compared through the dynamic matching process. The
performance of the proposed mechanism is benchmarked against a naïve (and uninformed) se-
quential matching mechanism, which assigns asylum seekers according to their arrival order to a
fixed list of rotating localities. By ensuring that, in the absence of quotas, each locality receives
a similar amount of asylum seekers, a sequential matching mechanism tends to outperform truly
random matching mechanisms such as the ones adopted in, e.g., the United States, Switzerland
and Sweden. The naïve sequential matching mechanism, consequently, provides a more severe
benchmark for the proposed mechanism than a truly random mechanism (simulation results for
the truly random mechanism appear in Appendix B).
As explained in Section 3, asylum seekers are partitioned into three different sets in the
analysis, i.e., the asylum seekers that are considered acceptable by all localities (D), the asylum
seekers that are acceptable by some but not all localities (D), and the non-demanded asylum
seekers (D). The asylum seekers in the set D thrive best in some environment and not in others,
21Note that misclassification error refers to observations wrongly (and not randomly) classified, and thus, for a
binary variable, 50 percent misclassification error represents a zero-predictive-power scenario.
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representing the empirical synergies documented by, e.g., Bansak et al. (2018), Damm (2009)
and Edin et al. (2003). The simulations allow for autocorrelation of preferences across localities,
so each asylum seeker in group D is acceptable by either a majority (on average 75 percent) or a
minority (on average 25 percent) of the localities.
The proposed mechanism exploits the synergies of asylum seekers with heterogeneous local-
ities to perform efficient and unenvious matchings. Therefore, relative to the naïve sequential
matching mechanism, it produces larger efficiency gains and less envious matchings as the pro-
portion of asylum seekers in the set D increases in the sample.22 Acceptability is approximated
with employment, and the simulated flows of asylum seekers are calibrated to match the aggre-
gate numbers from Bansak et al. (2018) for the Unites States. For Sweden, these numbers are
based on the 2016 employment outcomes of the 2013 wave of asylum seekers. More precisely,
28 percent (45 percent) of the asylum seekers are assumed to belong to the set D (the set D).
This number represents the lowest (highest) employment rate in any of the 21 Swedish regional
entities of the 2013 wave.
Figure 1 compares the performance of the proposed mechanism (AEM) with increasing de-
grees of misclassification error in the locality-specific partitions with that of the naïve sequential
matching mechanism, in terms of both envy and efficiency loss. The proportion of localities in
the sample envying some locality by at least one and at least five asylum seekers are used as
measures of envy. If the locality-specific partitions are correct, Theorem 1 shows that the pro-
posed mechanism guarantees that envy is bounded by a single asylum seeker. Remarkably, Panel
1a shows that the share of localities envying another locality by at least one asylum seeker de-
creases with the number of asylum seekers per locality, and converges towards zero. Even with
misclassification error, Panels 1a and 1b in Figure 1 show that the proposed matching mecha-
nism always outperforms the naïve sequential matching mechanism in terms of envy. With the 24
percent misclassification error of Bansak et al. (2018), in the Swedish case the proposed mech-
anism guarantees already after 1,000 arrivals a decrease of 23 percent in the share of envying
municipalities, and of 45 percent in the share of envying municipalities by more than five asylum
seekers (here it should be noted that there were around 25,000 asylum seekers in Sweden in 2016
and 2017).23
In Panel 1c in Figure 1 the efficiency loss is measured as the share of asylum seekers that,
while acceptable for some localities, end up in a locality that considers them unacceptable. This
measure reflects the preferences of asylum seekers of achieving the best possible outcomes for
their future, and is in a Pareto efficient matching always equal to zero. Even with misclassifi-
22In the extreme case in which all asylum seekers are either always acceptable or non-demanded, the naïve
sequential matching mechanism produces matchings that are always Pareto efficient (however, envy does not need
to be bounded by a single asylum seeker).
23The corresponding numbers for the US case are 7 and 30 percent respectively. The difference is primarily due
to the higher number of localities in the US, causing envy measures with misclassification error to decrease more
slowly. A replication of these measures for different combinations of D and D proportions for 21 localities appears
in Appendix B.
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Figure 1: The proposed mechanism’s sensitivity to misclassification error
(a) Percentage of localities envying some locality by at least one asylum seeker
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(b) Percentage of localities envying some locality by at least five asylum seekers
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(c) Percentage of mismatched acceptable asylum seekers
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NOTES: A thousand waves of asylum seekers of 1,000 asylum seekers each is simulated, distributed across 51 locations in the United States and
the 21 Swedish regional entities (län). The measures of efficiency loss and envy are computed at each matching, comparing the performance of
the proposed mechanism (with increasing degrees of misclassification error) with that of the naïve sequential matching mechanism. The flows of
asylum seekers are calibrated to match the numbers reported by Bansak et al. (2018) for the United States (D: 34 percent; D: 39 percent) and
average 2016 employment outcomes of the 2013 asylum seeker wave in Sweden (D: 28 percent; D: 45 percent).
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cation error, the proposed mechanism produces strong efficiency gains with respect to the naïve
sequential matching mechanism. With the 24 percent misclassification error of Bansak et al.
(2018), the proposed mechanism decreases the share of mismatched acceptable asylum seekers
by about 50 percent.
6.2 Choice of Quotas
The presence of heterogeneous quotas across localities introduces a further seasonality-related
concern. For example, in Sweden each locality has by law the obligation of reserving housing
units for asylum seekers (Swedish Law, SFS:2016:38, 2016). Yearly quotas coupled with the
proposed mechanism will lead smaller localities to exhaust all their housing obligation in a few
months, and thus will be obliged to provide housing units only at a given time of the year. Instead,
larger localities will have to provide housing throughout the year. A solution to this disparity
would be splitting yearly quotas in, e.g., trimester quotas, and dynamically match asylum seekers
within each trimester. This section shows that such strategy is feasible and, as with random flows
of asylum seekers, the performance of the proposed mechanism does not suffer from splitting
quotas across shorter time periods.
A thousand random flows of asylum seekers is simulated and calibrated as in Figure 1 for
Sweden using the 2017 quotas.24 For each flow of asylum seekers, quotas are split up in yearly,
semestral, trimestral and monthly intervals.25 For each interval, the matching mechanism restarts
either blindly (i.e., resetting the aggregated envy to at zero at the start of the considered sub-
period) or by initiating the mechanism in every sub-period after the first with the envy matrix
calculated at the end of the previous sub-period for all localities (including those which filled
their quotas). Therefore, even with no misclassification error in the partition, it is possible that
some localities, which filled their quotas early in the sub-period, envy (or are envied by) others
by more than one asylum seeker at the beginning of subsequent sub-periods. The process of
transferring envy measures across periods is referred to as envy legacy. The measures of envy
and efficiency loss are then compared at the end of the year, when the flow of asylum seekers
has been completely assigned. All results are benchmarked against those obtained by the naïve
sequential matching mechanism.
Table 3 reports measures of efficiency and fairness loss computed at the end of the assignment
year for each of the simulated asylum seeker flows across all localities, including those dropping
out of the mechanism once their quota was filled. This exercise reveals three relevant properties
of the proposed order mechanism when constrained by heterogeneous quotas. First, while the
proposed mechanism can produce efficiency and fairness losses due to unequally sized quotas,
it still strongly outperforms the standard naïve sequential matching mechanism. Second, with
24These quotas are available at the website of the Swedish Migration Board (www.migrationsverket.se).
25In 2017, the sum of all quotas was 23,600. For simplicity, each yearly regional quota is rounded to a number
divisible by 12, and thus flows of 23,568 asylum seekers are considered.
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Table 3: Performance of the assignment algorithm if quotas are split over multiple sub-periods
Percentage of mismatched acceptable asylum seekers Number of localities envying some locality
by at least one asylum seeker
Year Semester Trimester Month Year Semester Trimester Month
Sequential 22.97 22.94 22.96 22.96 19.95 19.93 19.90 19.91
(0.30) (0.32) (0.29) (0.30) (0.63) (0.65) (0.65) (0.61)
[22.96] [22.95] [22.95] [22.97] [20.00] [20.00] [20.00] [20.00]
AEM 7.11 7.10 7.11 7.12 1.24 1.19 1.22 1.19
(0.22) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.43) (0.39) (0.41) (0.39)
[7.11] [7.10] [7.10] [7.12] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00]
AEM with envy legacy 7.11 7.20 7.28 7.33 1.24 1.00 1.00 1.00
(0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.23) (0.43) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00)
[7.11] [7.21] [7.27] [7.33] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00]
NOTES: A thousand waves of 23,568 asylum seekers each is simulated, distributed across 21 Swedish regional entities (län) according to 2017
Swedish regional quotas. The table reports the average, standard deviation (in parentheses) and median (in brackets) of fairness and efficiency
loss measures calculated after the assignment of the 23,568th asylum seeker for (i) the proposed mechanism restarted blindly, (ii) the proposed
mechanism allowing for dynamic legacies in envy across sub-periods, and (iii) the naïve sequential matching mechanism. Because the number
of localities is constant, the table reports the number instead of the share of envying localities as fairness loss measure. Flows of asylum seekers
are calibrated to match average 2016 employment outcomes of the 2013 asylum seeker wave in Sweden (D: 28 percent; D: 45 percent).
Autocorrelation of locality preferences is allowed for each asylum seeker.
random refugee flows, partitioning the quotas across subperiods and restarting the mechanism
each time with zero envy across localities does not affect its performance. Third, allowing for
envy matrices to be transferred across subperiods can improve fairness at a small efficiency loss.
While this last property emerges in this particular manner for the specific Swedish situation,
examining the sources of this trade-off delivers an intuitive understanding of the implicit trade-
off between efficiency and fairness created by heterogeneous quotas. The largest regional entity
in Sweden receives alone 30% of all asylum seekers in a given year, with the second and third
largest localities receiving 16% and 12%, respectively. Such inequality in quotas imply that the
largest localities will be the last to fill their quotas, and thus a mechanism satisfying rotation will
always assign to those localities the last thousands asylum seekers, independently of their type.
Because the calibrations of the asylum seeker flows imply that a random refugee is more likely
to be unacceptable than acceptable for a given locality, it follows that the largest regional entities
will accumulate a lot of envy towards smaller localities.
With yearly quotas, the largest entity envies some other smaller locality in every simulation,
and the second or third largest 24% of the time. By partitioning yearly quotas into smaller
intervals and allowing for envy legacy across subperiods, municipalities that have accumulated
lots of envy in the previous subperiods are more likely to be at the first places in the priority
order. Therefore, they receive relatively more acceptable asylum seekers in the following period,
and fill their quotas slightly faster. As a consequence, the second and third largest locality never
envy any other locality anymore. However, as they fill their quotas earlier, a longer tail flow
of asylum seekers can only be assigned to the largest locality at the end of the period, thereby
slightly reducing efficiency.
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This process highlights that order mechanisms satisfying rotation with heterogenous locality-
asylum seeker synergies perform better the longer a large enough amount of localities remains
in the market. A higher number of available localities implies a higher likelihood that one of them
finds an asylum seeker acceptable, thereby—by exploiting informed assignment—simultaneously
improving efficiency and fairness.
6.3 The Envy Bounded by One Conjecture
As discussed in Section 5, we conjecture that envy is always bounded by a single acceptable
asylum seeker and by a single unacceptable asylum seeker whenever the matching is selected by
an order mechanism that satisfies rotation. To provide some empirical evidence for this conjec-
ture, 5,000 waves of 1,000 seekers each are simulated, distributed across 20 localities, assuming
that the characteristics of the refugee flow are random. At each assigned asylum seeker, the
maximum envy a locality has towards the others in the market is calculated. This simulation
gives a total of 100 million envy measures by locality. Envy measures are split across envy
on acceptable asylum seekers (another locality has more asylum seekers considered acceptable)
and envy on unacceptable asylum seekers (another locality has fewer asylum seekers considered
unacceptable).
Table 4: Simulation results for the conjecture that envy is bounded by one in acceptable and
unacceptable asylum seekers.
p10 p50 p90 max p10 p50 p90 max
Assigned asylum seekers Acceptable asylum seekers Unacceptable asylum seekers
1-100 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
101-500 -2 0 1 1 -1 0 1 1
501-1000 -6 -1 1 1 -5 0 1 1
NOTES: Five thousand waves of one thousand asylum seekers each is simulated, distributed across 20 regional entities, delivering a total of 100
million locality-specific meximum envy measures (the highest envy towards any of the remaining 19 localities). The table reports the maximum,
90th, 50th, and 10th percentile of maximum envy at specific intervals of asylum seeker arrival. Envy on acceptable asylum seekers is separated
from envy on unascceptable asylum seeker. The characteristics of the refugee flow (proportions of D and D asylum seeker and autocorrelation
of preferences across municipalities) is randomized for each asylum seeker flow.
Table 4 shows the 10th, 50th and the 90th percentile of observed maximum envy across these
100 million observations, arranged by three intervals of number of assigned asylum seeker in
the flow (1–100, 101–500, and 501–1,000). As can be seen from the table, the conjecture is not
violated a single time. Moreover, the low percentiles of envy measures are decreasing with the
number of arrivals, implying that the likelihood of a locality to be truly unenvious increases with
the number of assigned asylum seekers.
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7 Conclusions
This paper has investigated dynamic refugee matching as a market design application. A specific
matching mechanism was proposed and it has been demonstrated that any matching selected by
the proposed mechanism is Pareto efficient and satisfies envy bounded by a single asylum seeker.
This theoretical finding hinges on the assumption that there is no misclassification error. For
example, Bansak et al. (2018) report 24 percent misclassification error for their preferred refugee
assignment models estimated on US data. However, even with a 24 percent misclassification
error, the proposed mechanism (i) decreases the share of mismatched acceptable asylum seekers
by around 50 percent and (ii) reduces the share of envying localities by between 7 and 45 percent.
This paper does not empirically estimate prediction functions, as we currently do not have
access to the necessary data. By exploiting refugee data from the United States and Switzerland,
Bansak et al. (2018) estimate locality-specific partitions by a machine learning algorithm, allow-
ing for locality-specific synergies with heterogeneous refugees. Because their algorithm focuses
on minimizing prediction error rather than uncovering structural parameters determining labor
market success (Mullainathan and Spiess, 2017), machine learning is a particularly appropri-
ate tool in this context. Nonetheless, such an unstructured approach highlights the low external
validity of the estimated prediction function, which therefore needs to be re-estimated and re-
calibrated in different scenarios and as new data becomes available. The necessity to update
the prediction function has the benefit of alleviating the problem of displacement and general
equilibrium effects due to the field implementation of mechanisms as the one proposed in this
paper (Crépon et al., 2013). If the labor demand for asylum seekers is very inelastic, then even
an efficient assignment does not guarantee employment for asylum seekers predicted as accept-
able. In practice, this mismatch would increase prediction error in our predictions. However,
re-estimating the prediction function with updated data would capture these effects and return a
better predicted “demand matrix” in a later stage.
A more theoretical remark is that the proposed mechanism assumes that asylum seekers ar-
rive one-by-one. This means that the current form of the mechanism does not take families of
asylum seekers into account (see, e.g., Andersson and Ehlers, 2016, for a mechanism that keeps
families intact in house allocation problems with asylum seekers). To also account for families,
each asylum seeker can be described to be of a specific size representing the number of fam-
ily members and some (limited) flexibility in the quotas must be introduced. In this case, envy
cannot be guaranteed to be bounded by a single asylum seeker but is instead bounded by the
maximal family size in the sequence.
Finally, this paper has abstracted from issues related to manipulability. It is well-established
in the mechanism design literature that agents (localities in this paper) often cannot be prevented
from manipulating mechanisms in their advantage by misrepresenting preferences. In the frame-
work investigated in this paper, this means that localities may gain by classifying an acceptable
asylum seeker as unacceptable or vice versa. To analyze this type of strategic behavior, some no-
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tion of dynamic (non-)manipulability needs to be introduced. Such analysis is beyond the scope
of this paper. Nevertheless, because the preferences exploited in this paper are derived from esti-
mation and not first-party reports, manipulability is unlikely to constitute a major problem in the
considered dynamic refugee matching problem.
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Appendix A: Proofs
This Appendix contains the proofs of all results in the paper.
Proof of Theorem 1. To prove part (i), suppose that envy not is bounded by a single asylum
seeker at matching x(k). This means that there are two localities in M(k), say m and m′, and
two integers, say k0 and k1 (where 0 < k0 < k1 ≤ k), such that:
(I) locality m is indifferent between bundles xm(k0 − 1) and xm′(k0 − 1),
(II) locality m envies locality m′ by exactly one asylum seeker at matching x(k0),
(III) locality m envies locality m′ by exactly two asylum seekers at matching x(k1).
Let k0 and k1 be the largest and the smallest integers, respectively, satisfying conditions (I)–
(III), and consider the subsequence (s(k0), . . . , s(k1)) of the sequence s. Because the integers
k0 and k1 are chosen in the above way, locality m is not matched to any asylum seeker in the
subsequence (s(k0 + 1), . . . , s(k1 − 1)), and locality m′ is not matched to any non-demanded
asylum seeker or any asylum seeker that is acceptable for locality m in the subsequence (s(k0 +
1), . . . , s(k1 − 1)). Hence, there four reasons to why conditions (I)–(III) hold:
(a) Asylum seekers s(k0) and s(k1) are acceptable to locality m but both s(k0) and s(k1) are
matched to locality m′,
(b) asylum seeker s(k0) is non-demanded but matched to locality m and asylum seeker s(k1)
is acceptable to locality m but matched to locality m′,
(c) asylum seeker s(k0) is acceptable to locality m but matched to locality m′ and asylum
seeker s(k1) is non-demanded but matched to locality m,
(d) asylum seekers s(k0) and s(k1) are non-demanded but both are matched to locality m.
It is only proved that cases (a) and (b) cannot occur as the corresponding proofs of cases (c) and
(d) are almost identical.
To prove that (a) cannot occur, note that asylum seeker s(k0) is acceptable for both m and
m′. Hence, by rotation of (π, σ), it follows that locality m′ has a higher position than locality
m in π(k0) and the lowest position in π(k0 + 1). Because asylum seeker s(k1) is matched to
locality m′, it must also be the case that locality m′ has a higher position than locality m in
π(k1). The latter can, however, not occur. To see this, recall first that locality m is not matched
to any asylum seeker in the subsequence (s(k0), . . . , s(k1)). Similarly, m′ is not matched to any
asylum seeker in the subsequence (s(k0 + 1), . . . , s(k1 − 1)). Hence, by rotation of (π, σ), the
relative positions among m and m′ do not change for the priority orders π(k0 + 1), . . . , π(k1),
which is a contradiction to m′ being matched to the demanded asylum seeker s(k1).
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To prove that (b) cannot occur, recall that asylum seeker s(k0) is non-demanded and that
locality m envies locality m′ at matching x(k0). Hence, by rotation of (π, σ), locality m has a
higher position than locality m′ in π(k0 +1). Because the overdemanded asylum seeker s(k1) is
matched to locality m′, it must be the case that locality m′ has a higher position than locality m
in π(k1). The latter can, however, not occur. To see this, recall first that localitym is not matched
to any asylum seeker in the subsequence (s(k0), . . . , s(k1)). Similarly, m′ is not matched to any
asylum seeker in the subsequence (s(k0 + 1), . . . , s(k1 − 1)). Hence, by rotation of (π, σ), the
relative positions among m and m′ do not change for the priority orders π(k0 + 1), . . . , π(k1),
which is a contradiction to m′ being matched to the demanded asylum seeker s(k1).
To prove part (ii), suppose that x(k) is not Pareto efficient. Consider the localities in the
set M(k) and the asylum seekers in the set A(k). Because x(k) is not Pareto efficient, by as-
sumption, there exists a matching x′(k) where the quotas are respected for all localities in M(k),
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. (3)
Note next that a locality in M(k) can only be matched to an unacceptable asylum seeker if
the asylum seeker also is unacceptable for all other localities in M(k). This follows since ϕ is

















i.e., that the total number of acceptable asylum seekers matched to the localities in M(k) is
greater at matching x′(k) than at matching x(k). But this is not possible since all asylum seekers
in A(k) are matched to some locality in M(k) which finds them acceptable by construction of
the order mechanism ϕ. Hence, x(k) must be Pareto efficient. 
Proof of Corollary 1. Because matching x(k) is selected by ϕ, it follows from Theorem 1 that
envy for locality m towards locality m′ is bounded by a single asylum seeker, i.e., that:
|A+m(xm(k))| − |A−m(xm(k))|+ 1 ≥ |A+m(xm′(k))| − |A−m(xm′(k))|. (5)
To obtain a contradiction, suppose now that the statement is not true. Then:
|A+m(xm′(k))| > |A+m(xm(k))|, (6)
|A−m(xm(k))| > |A−m(xm′(k))|. (7)
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Inequality (6) implies |A+m(xm′(k))|−1 ≥ |A+m(xm(k))|. This condition together with inequality
(5) implies |A−m(xm′(k))| ≥ |A−m(xm(k))|. But the latter inequality contradicts inequality (7). 
Proof of Theorem 2. It is only proved that locality m does not envy any locality with a higher
position in π(k + 1) since the second part of the theorem is based on symmetrical arguments.
The result is proved by induction. It is first demonstrated that the result is true for π(2). Three
cases must be considered:
(1.a) Asylum seeker s(1) is non-demanded. Because s(1) is non-demanded, no locality in m(1)
will envy the locality which is matched to s(1) and the locality which is matched to s(1)
will envy all localities in M(1). Because (π, σ) satisfies rotation, the locality that is
matched to s(1) will have the highest position in π(2). These arguments show that no
locality in M(1) envies any locality with a higher position in π(2).
(1.b) Asylum seeker s(1) is demanded. In this case, s(1) is matched to the only locality finding
s(1) acceptable, and no locality will envy this locality. Similarly, the locality which is
matched to s(1) will not envy any other locality since s(1) is acceptable. Because (π, σ)
satisfies rotation, it follows that π(1) = π(2), and, consequently, no locality in M(1)
envies any locality with a higher priority in π(2).
(1.c) Asylum seeker s(1) is overdemanded. In this case, asylum seeker s(1) is matched to the lo-
cality inM(1) with the highest position in π(1) which finds asylum seeker s(1) acceptable.
This locality will be envied by all localities finding s(1) acceptable, and the locality which
is matched to s(1) will not envy any locality in M(1). Because (π, σ) satisfies rotation, the
locality which is matched to s(1) will have the lowest priority in π(2). These arguments
show that no locality in M(1) envies any locality with a higher position in π(2).
From the above arguments, it is concluded that the statement is true for π(2). Consider now the
induction hypothesis that the result holds for π(k) for an arbitrary k ∈ {2, . . . , n − 1}. Given
this assumption, it remains to show that the result is true for π(k). Again, three cases must be
considered:
(k.a) Asylum seeker s(k) is non-demanded. Because asylum seeker s(k) is not acceptable to
any locality in M(k) and because envy is bounded by a single asylum seeker at matching
x(k − 1) by Theorem 1, no locality in M(k) will envy the locality which is matched to
s(k) at matching x(k). Because (π, σ) satisfies rotation, the locality which is matched to
s(k) will have a higher priority in π(k + 1) than all localities which the locality envies at
matching x(k). These arguments show that no locality in M(k) envies any locality with a
higher position in π(k + 1).
(k.b) Asylum seeker s(k) is demanded. In this case, asylum seeker s(k) is matched to the only
locality which finds s(k) acceptable. Because (π, σ) satisfies rotation, it follows that
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π(k) = π(k + 1). Consequently, the result holds for π(k + 1) since the result is true
for π(k) by the induction hypothesis.
(k.c) Asylum seeker s(k) is overdemanded. In this case, asylum seeker s(k) is matched to the
locality in M(k) with the highest position in π(k) finding asylum seeker s(k) acceptable.
Because envy is bounded by a single asylum seeker at matching x(k − 1) by Theorem
1, the locality which is matched to the acceptable asylum seeker s(k) will not envy any
locality at matching x(k). Then by rotation of (π, σ), the locality which is matched to s(k)
will have the lowest position in π(k+1). But then the result holds by the above arguments.
The above three cases, together with the result for π(2) and the induction assumption, proves
that locality m does not envy any locality with a higher priority in π(k). 
Appendix B: Additional Simulation Results
This Appendix collects additional simulation results and further checks on the robustness of the
performance of the order mechanism as the characteristics of refugee flows vary. Tables 5 and 6
report the expected percentage improvement in measures of fairness and efficiency granted by the
proposed mechanism over the naïve sequential matching mechanism for varying combinations
of the proportion of non-demanded (D) and always demanded (D) asylum seekers in simulated
arrival flows. For each combination of parameters, 1,000 refugee flows of 1,000 asylum seekers
each are simulated and allocated to 21 localities. Each table row reports the average percentage
difference across these simulated flows after the mechanism allocated the last refugee in the flow.
All simulations allow for correlation of locality preferences for each asylum seeker.
The tables show that the relative improvement in fairness with respect to the naïve sequential
matching mechanism is larger when misclassification error is lower and the proportion of asy-
lum seekers in the set D is higher. The relative improvement in efficiency depends solely on the
extent of misclassification error, and always ranges between 100 and 0 percent. The only excep-
tions consist in the situations in which all asylum seekers are either all in the set D or all in the
set D, where both assignment strategies produce Pareto efficient and fair allocations. The naïve
sequential matching mechanism always produces a Pareto efficient (but not necessarily fair) al-
location if no asylum seekers of type D exist. In general, the proposed matching mechanism
always outperforms the naïve sequential matching mechanism as long as some asylum seekers
of type D exist and we some information about the locality-specific partitions exist (less than
50% misclassification error).
Figure 2 shows that the naïve sequential matching mechanism outperforms a truly random
mechanism in terms of fairness. This result is due to the fact that the sequential assignment
guarantees at least that the difference in the number of asylum seekers across localities is bounded
by one.
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Finally, Figure 3 provides evidence for the conjecture that envy is bounded by a single ac-
ceptable asylum seeker and a single unacceptable asylum seeker.
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Table 5: Simulated relative reduction in efficiency and envy measures with the proposed algo-
rithm, by misclassification error in locality partitions, percentage of asylum seekers in set D and
percentage of asylum seekers in set D in the simulated flows (I).
Percentage decrease in the share of localities Percentage decrease in the share of
envying some locality by at least one asylum seeker mismatched acceptable asylum seekers
Miscl. error: 0% 10% 25% 40% 50% 0% 10% 25% 40% 50%
%D in flow %D in flow: 0.00
0.00 100.00 100.00 93.80 29.99 -1.77 100.00 79.96 49.96 19.82 -0.02
10.00 100.00 99.97 89.16 25.02 -2.03 100.00 80.07 49.96 19.80 -0.07
20.00 100.00 99.93 82.88 21.44 -1.69 100.00 80.05 50.07 20.03 0.16
30.00 100.00 99.51 74.54 18.07 -2.17 100.00 79.98 49.90 19.95 0.05
40.00 100.00 98.23 64.96 15.30 -1.61 100.00 79.96 49.82 20.15 0.11
50.00 100.00 94.75 53.64 11.78 -1.75 100.00 79.92 49.81 20.01 -0.19
60.00 100.00 86.85 43.82 9.80 -1.98 100.00 79.97 50.17 19.85 0.02
70.00 100.00 72.09 32.74 7.03 -1.95 100.00 79.94 50.12 20.06 0.50
80.00 99.72 51.67 20.74 3.89 -2.96 100.00 80.13 49.92 19.68 -0.20
90.00 90.28 25.70 10.31 0.53 -3.56 100.00 80.25 50.10 20.55 0.92
%D in flow %D in flow: 10.00
0.00 100.00 100.00 90.27 26.49 -1.92 100.00 79.95 50.04 20.17 -0.21
10.00 100.00 99.92 83.43 21.65 -1.65 100.00 80.03 49.97 19.99 0.04
20.00 100.00 99.60 74.64 18.06 -1.32 100.00 79.94 50.17 20.20 0.10
30.00 100.00 98.36 62.94 13.86 -1.80 100.00 79.94 49.71 19.82 -0.10
40.00 100.00 94.06 50.76 10.42 -1.72 100.00 79.91 49.81 19.62 -0.07
50.00 100.00 84.62 37.44 7.56 -2.10 100.00 79.91 49.82 19.76 -0.25
60.00 99.97 67.50 26.39 5.09 -1.80 100.00 80.08 49.91 20.24 0.52
70.00 99.40 42.33 16.03 2.78 -2.34 100.00 80.26 50.22 20.05 -0.23
80.00 89.35 16.53 5.85 0.15 -2.25 100.00 80.09 50.14 20.37 0.33
90.00 89.58 -2.63 -2.79 -2.90 -2.96 nan nan nan nan nan
%D in flow %D in flow: 20.00
0.00 100.00 99.95 85.30 22.92 -1.57 100.00 80.14 50.01 20.05 0.16
10.00 100.00 99.67 75.77 18.02 -1.70 100.00 79.94 50.05 20.06 -0.15
20.00 100.00 98.42 63.35 13.86 -1.29 100.00 80.10 49.91 19.97 0.32
30.00 100.00 94.39 50.20 10.41 -1.64 100.00 79.99 50.03 19.90 0.03
40.00 100.00 84.21 36.35 7.00 -1.78 100.00 80.06 49.61 19.78 -0.09
50.00 99.97 65.45 24.54 4.38 -1.87 100.00 79.99 50.10 20.16 0.15
60.00 99.39 39.40 14.36 2.48 -1.67 100.00 80.17 50.16 19.90 0.03
70.00 86.44 14.85 4.96 -0.03 -1.69 100.00 79.77 49.78 19.61 -0.06
80.00 38.23 -1.26 -1.78 -2.00 -2.04 nan nan nan nan nan
%D in flow %D in flow: 30.00
0.00 100.00 99.77 79.59 19.00 -1.56 100.00 80.10 50.04 20.04 0.06
10.00 100.00 98.80 66.18 14.78 -1.96 100.00 80.02 49.98 20.03 0.04
20.00 100.00 95.74 51.91 10.29 -1.88 100.00 80.01 50.29 20.05 0.18
30.00 100.00 85.55 37.79 6.69 -1.84 100.00 80.00 50.15 20.10 -0.07
40.00 99.96 66.31 23.75 4.07 -2.05 100.00 79.94 49.91 20.00 -0.39
50.00 99.03 39.31 12.48 2.36 -1.76 100.00 79.99 50.24 19.86 -0.18
60.00 84.66 14.75 4.16 -0.20 -1.98 100.00 79.88 49.84 20.60 0.13
70.00 94.87 -0.98 -1.72 -1.84 -1.82 nan nan nan nan nan
NOTES: A thousand waves of asylum seekers of 1,000 asylum seekers each is simulated, distributed across 21 localities and for varying propor-
tions of D and D. The measures of efficiency loss and envy are computed at the end of each, benchmarking the performance of the proposed
mechanism (with increasing degrees of misclassification error) against that of the naïve sequential matching mechanism.
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Table 6: Simulated relative reduction in efficiency and envy measures with the proposed algo-
rithm, by misclassification error in locality partitions, percentage of asylum seekers in set D and
percentage of asylum seekers in set D in the simulated flows (II).
Percentage decrease in the share of localities Percentage decrease in the share of
envying some locality by at least one asylum seeker mismatched acceptable asylum seekers
Miscl. error: 0% 10% 25% 40% 50% 0% 10% 25% 40% 50%
%D in flow %D in flow: 40.00
0.00 100.00 99.38 71.88 15.99 -1.77 100.00 80.06 50.23 20.24 0.26
10.00 100.00 96.43 56.11 11.75 -1.33 100.00 79.95 50.31 20.00 -0.07
20.00 99.99 88.05 39.95 7.67 -1.81 100.00 80.12 50.16 20.28 -0.06
30.00 99.96 69.05 24.79 4.36 -1.86 100.00 79.99 50.13 19.89 -0.13
40.00 99.30 41.47 13.17 2.23 -2.19 100.00 79.97 50.13 19.77 -0.00
50.00 87.44 15.13 3.78 0.02 -1.84 100.00 80.07 49.75 19.92 0.26
60.00 43.68 -0.67 -1.54 -1.64 -1.69 nan nan nan nan nan
%D in flow %D in flow: 50.00
0.00 100.00 98.12 62.27 13.03 -2.23 100.00 79.88 50.10 20.04 -0.15
10.00 100.00 91.49 44.67 8.52 -2.20 100.00 80.02 50.08 20.17 0.02
20.00 99.96 73.88 27.25 4.58 -2.12 100.00 79.85 49.70 19.89 -0.15
30.00 99.01 45.12 13.60 2.21 -1.88 100.00 80.18 50.19 20.04 0.25
40.00 83.06 17.05 4.91 -0.06 -2.01 100.00 79.77 50.21 20.16 -0.28
50.00 100.00 -0.57 -1.54 -1.80 -1.81 nan nan nan nan nan
%D in flow %D in flow: 60.00
0.00 100.00 94.72 53.24 9.85 -2.67 100.00 79.87 49.90 20.11 -0.12
10.00 99.94 79.99 31.48 5.27 -2.28 100.00 80.06 49.94 20.07 -0.03
20.00 99.27 50.25 15.87 2.54 -2.09 100.00 79.91 50.10 20.25 -0.04
30.00 88.58 18.48 4.44 -0.32 -2.03 100.00 79.85 50.09 19.74 -0.13
40.00 48.58 -0.35 -1.81 -2.07 -2.05 nan nan nan nan nan
%D in flow %D in flow: 70.00
0.00 99.95 87.61 40.74 6.48 -3.07 100.00 80.17 49.97 19.86 0.07
10.00 98.89 58.51 19.56 2.33 -2.84 100.00 80.08 49.97 19.71 -0.59
20.00 80.76 22.64 6.18 0.09 -2.16 100.00 80.01 50.10 20.28 0.06
30.00 -3.19 -0.01 -1.89 -2.23 -2.30 nan nan nan nan nan
%D in flow %D in flow: 80.00
0.00 99.08 72.15 28.20 3.09 -4.27 100.00 80.15 50.06 19.96 -0.45
10.00 89.40 30.67 7.57 -0.43 -2.91 100.00 80.07 49.47 19.69 -0.62
20.00 53.27 1.37 -1.98 -2.49 -2.69 nan nan nan nan nan
%D in flow %D in flow: 90.00
0.00 78.12 42.62 12.35 -3.69 -9.24 100.00 79.94 49.98 20.03 -0.09
10.00 -0.66 7.53 -2.77 -3.93 -4.21 nan nan nan nan nan
NOTES: A thousand waves of asylum seekers of 1,000 asylum seekers each is simulated, distributed across 21 localities and for varying propor-
tions of D and D. The measures of efficiency loss and envy are computed at the end of each, benchmarking the performance of the proposed
mechanism (with increasing degrees of misclassification error) against that of the naïve sequential matching mechanism.
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Figure 2: Comparison of sequential and truly random assignments .
(a) Percentage of localities envying some locality by at
least one asylum seeker
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(b) Percentage of localities envying some locality by at
least five asylum seeker
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(c) Percentage of mismatched acceptable asylum seekers
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NOTES: 1,000 waves of asylum seekers of 1,000 asylum seekers each is simulated, distributed across 21 Swedish regional entities (län). The
measures of efficiency and envy is computed at each matching, comparing the performance of the naïve sequential matching mechanism with
that of the truly random assignment mechanism. The flows of asylum seekers are calibrated to match the average 2016 employment outcomes of
the 2013 asylum seeker wave in Sweden (D: 28 percent; D: 45 percent).
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Figure 3: Simulation for the conjecture that envy is bounded by one in acceptable and unaccept-
able asylum seekers.
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NOTES: 5,000 waves of 1,000 asylum seekers each is simulated, distributed across 20 localities. The characteristics of the refugee flow are
random. This simulation gives us a total of 100 million maximum envy measures by locality (the maximum envy that each locality has towards
any of the remaining 19 localities). Envy measures are split across envy on acceptable asylum seekers (another municipality has more asylum
seekers considered acceptable) and envy on unacceptable asylum seekers (another municipality has less asylum seekers considered unacceptable).
The figure plots the maximum, median and minimum observed maximum envy across these 100 million observations, arranged by number of
assigned asylum seeker in the flow. The maximum measure never exceeds one for either acceptable and unacceptable asylum seekers, while the
minimum of maximum envy decreases with the number of assigned asylum seekers.
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